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Scientific literature has extensively dealt with variable pay-for-performance (see e.g. 
Frey and Osterloh 2002). Despite the fact that serious problems linked to this 
approach have thus become obvious, many authors continue to  support compensation 
according to predetermined performance criteria because they are committed to the 
traditional concept of the „homo oeconomicus“. 
Overall, there has been a marked change of opinion in academia. The idea that people 
are solely self-interested and materially orientated has been thrown over board by 
leading scholars. Empirical, in particular experimental research has shown that under 
suitable conditions human beings care for the well-being of other persons. Above all, 
they are not solely interested in material gains. Recognition by co-workers is greatly 
important. Many workers are intrinsically motivated, i.e. perform work for its own 
sake because it is found challenging and worth undertaking. This applies not only to 
qualified employees but also to persons fulfilling simple tasks. They often are proud 
of their work and performance. 
There are four major arguments against variable pay-for-performance: 
(1) In a modern economy, it is practically impossible to determine tasks that are to 
be fulfilled in the future precisely enough so that variable pay-for-performance 
can be applied. In a society continually faced with new challenges, superiors 
oftentimes find it impossible to fix ex ante what an employee will have to do 
in the future. 
(2) It would be naïve to assume that the persons subjected to variable pay-for-
performance would accept the respective criteria in a passive way and fulfill 
their work accordingly. Rather, they spend much energy and time trying to 
manipulate these criteria in their favour. This is facilitated by the fact that 
employees often know the specific features of their work better than their 
superiors. The wage explosions observable in many sectors of the economy 
can at least partly be attributed to such manipulations, e.g. when managers are 
able to contract easily achievable performance goals. 
(3) Variable pay-for-performance results in employees restricting their work to 
those areas covered by the performance criteria. In the literature, this is known  
as the “multiple tasking” problem. This may induce employees to spend 
considerable time and energy during their work trying to find a better paid job 
with another firm. They therefore neglect their tasks insofar as they are not 
contractually fixed by the performance criteria. 
(4) Variable pay-for-performance tends to crowd out intrinsic work motivation 
and therewith the joy of fulfilling a particular task. However, such motivation 
is of great importance in a modern economy because it supports innovation 
and helps to fulfill tasks going beyond the ordinary. 
 
Many observers acknowledge these problems connected with variable pay-for-
performance and even emphasize them. They nevertheless cling to this form of 
compensation because they do not see any alternative. However, there are well-
proven and effective ways to induce the members of an organization to perform in a 
desired manner. The three most important ways are the following. 
The employees have to be carefully selected. Above all, it has to be checked whether 
the job seekers are interested in the work to be performed or solely in the money that 
will come along with it. In all too many sectors of the economy this task seems to 
have been neglected. In the financial sector, for example, many persons have been 
chosen whose only goal is to get as high a salary as possible. They therefore exhibit 
no loyalty to the firm and immediately accept any job that offers higher 
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compensation. As a result, the fluctuation among employees has increased strongly. 
Efficiency has been reduced because the tasks have to be taken over by ever new 
persons who lack the experience necessary. 
Secondly, employees have to be paid a fixed compensation corresponding to their 
performance. They must be given the signal that they are paid a good wage but that 
they are expected to work accordingly. Thus, a market wage has to be paid in order to 
be able to win and keep employees. The compensation can after some time be 
adjusted on the basis of a comprehensive evaluation of their work. This procedure 
avoids the multiple tasking problem. At the end of the year, one can also distribute 
part of the profit to employees according to their contribution to overall performance 
rather than according to ex ante criteria. 
Thirdly, awards can be used to enhance employees’ work motivation. Awards such as 
“Employee of the Month” support social recognition among the members of the firm. 
They should therefore be presented in a festive ceremony, emphasizing what type of 
performance is important to the firm. Research on awards in a call center of a credit 
card company suggests that the motivation of the persons getting the award is 
enhanced. The performance of the employees not getting an award is not reduced. 
Rather, they make an effort to get the award in the future (Neckermann, Cueni and 
Frey 2008). Employees working in a team are usually proud that (at least) one of its 
members has received an award. 
 
Variable pay-for-performance is an attractive concept to compensate employees only 
at first sight. It turns out to be a mistake when analyzed more thoroughly. As argued 
here, there are more favourable alternatives available. 
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